|
Interests, Passions and Politics: Assumptions of the U.S. Constitution Glenn Swogger, Jr., M.D. |
|||
The designers of the U.S. Constitution, in particular Madison and Adams, were acutely aware of individual and group psychodynamics and their impact on the function and viability of democratic government. They designed governmental structures and the relationship between the parts of government with explicit reference to how these structures would contain individual ambition and the drive for power; group conflict and the conflicts of various social, religious and economic interests; the needs of groups to define boundaries and enemies; the tendency of large groups to irrationality, impulsiveness and grandiosity; and the tendency of dominant groups to tyrannize and scapegoat minorities. The understanding of human behavior and motivation by the designers of the Constitution arose from a rich tradition of scrutiny and theorizing about human behavior by theologians, moral philosophers, poets, satirists and political theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries. This paper will explore key themes of this era and how their implications were translated into the design of a particular complex organization via the U.S. Constitution. The human understanding embedded in this process will be compared and contrasted with some current psychoanalytic concepts relevant to group and individual political and organizational behavior, to see if these perspectives from a different era might offer some "new" insights of use to us today. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: PSYCHODYNAMIC ASSUMPTIONS In my study of environmental groups (1994), I became increasingly aware of their self-identification as "public interest" groups and their identification of their opponents as "special interests". The implication was that one sort of "interest" was legitimate and honorable, and the other was not. My search to understand the difference between legitimate and illegitimate interests led me to read The Federalist Papers, 85 articles published in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788, and then published in book form, by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, urging adoption of the new Constitution. In attempting to understand the nature of democratic government and to outline a rationale for a particular form of governmental structure, namely the proposed Constitution of the United States, they focused on what they saw as enduring features of human involvement in political processes. While the Federalist Papers are extraordinary in their broad scope and in the depth of their understanding, Federalist No. 10 is particularly rich. In it, Madison discusses how a well-constructed government might "control the violence of faction".
Madison goes on to state some remarkable paradoxes regarding factions. It is impossible to remove the causes of faction, because to do so one must either "give every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests" which is manifestly impossible, or the freedom to express opinions and be politically active must be abrogated. "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire". Thus, although factions are the greatest danger to democracy, they are also its essential element. Madison goes on to say that:
When actual human beings participate in the democratic process, what we get is not only the rational and civic-minded citizen, but all the passions of the human psyche. This dichotomy parallels the interplay of the work group and the sentient group, described by Miller and Rice (1969). Madison expands his assertion of the role of property as a fundamental interest as follows:
Elsewhere, Madison gives property a "...larger and juster meaning" in which property "embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right...his opinions and free communication of them...his religious opinions...the safety and liberty of his person...the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them." (Madison, 1792) The second paradox of government in a democratic society is that those characteristics which lead people to be different, and to form conflicting factions, reflect abilities and achievements of great value:
The third and in some ways most profound paradox is that individuals and groups participating in the democratic process, biased as they are by their own interests, must make impartial judgments for the common good.
Madison brushes aside a simple appeal to higher values and good conscience, to a moral elite as a solution to this problem:
Madison goes on from this point to begin to elaborate those governmental structures and other elements which will help to modify, not the causes of faction, but its effects. But it is clear that he has set himself a hard task. For his understanding of human nature is such that our much celebrated "diversity" reflects significant individual characteristics, related to which are differences in one's position in the economic order, and that these differences inevitably lead to conflict and to difficulties in judging what might be best for the community as a whole. Madison also believed that ambition and self-love, as well as the passions engendered out of membership in a faction, adherence to a religious sect, or other intense belief system, will obscure in many instances a thoughtful, reflective, long-term consideration of social goods and governmental policy. Interests are not "bad". They reflect our vital relationship to community, livelihood, and belief. Democracies are formed just so interests may be represented. But democratic government poses the eternal problem of transmuting individual and group interests into goals and necessities for the larger society. What do we mean when we use the word "interest"? The first definition in the Oxford English Dictionary is "the relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title to, a claim upon, or a share in." A later definition states "the feeling of one who is concerned or has a personal concern in anything; hence, the state of feeling proper to such a relation; a feeling of concern for or curiosity about a person or thing" and, finally "the fact or quality of mattering; concernment, importance". One strand of the meaning of "interest" has to do with ownership. Another has to do with an enduring relationship of concern or involvement. It is worth taking note of the variant meaning of interest in the financial sense: money paid for the use of money lent. Here "interest" reveals that time is a dimension of the value of things. At an emotional and affective level, "interest" denotes a relationship, an involvement, with a thing, a person, a belief or an idea: "I am interested in the work of Freud". "I am interested in you". The affective and relational dimension of interest is in part tied to the concept of ownership; to "own" something is for it to be "my own", which can overlap with my understanding of me and my boundaries, as in the case of a transitional object. It is easy to forget in the Western context of abstract legal definitions of property that a place, a locality, to which I have an enduring relationship can be a part of me; that dear and treasured objects may be reflections or extensions of me; that certain objects that I own or possess in common with others may stand as symbols of my highest aspirations and values. (Isaac, 1969) Thus interests are broader than economic claims. Interests may include idealistic and ideological commitments. Currently, some assert "nature" as an interest. The "life of the unborn" is a passionate interest for some. The interest in justice of American abolitionists was sufficient to commit themselves and this country to the most bloody and destructive war in American history. Sometimes people sacrifice or even die for what they conceive of as their deepest interest. "Justice" and "fairness" are not only values, but in the sense that they command allegiance, support, political activity and sacrifice on the part of significant numbers of people, are also interests. In legal and economic matters, the courts have attempted to define who has an interest in a matter under consideration with the concept of "standing". "Standing" is evidenced by a clear-cut relationship of economic profit or loss or the possibility of personal injury. Because the concept of standing is more narrowly focused than that of interest, legal attempts have been made to broaden it, for example in the celebrated issue "Should Trees have Standing?". Similarly, with regard to social, political and economic matters, the concept of "stakeholders" attempts to define and legitimatize the concern of a wide range of groups around an organizational or political matter so as to justify and necessitate their involvement in some decisions. It is worth noting that Madison in the Federalist Papers, while giving predominance to economic interest, also refers to religious sects and passionate zealots for causes as interests which may evolve into factions. For Madison, factions are an amalgam of interests, passionate involvement, organization into politically active groups, and the machinations of their leadership in their ambition, love of power, or wishes for revenge or restitution. Madison recognized that factions also involved the need, familiar to modern students of group and intergroup dynamics, to define boundaries and enemies:
Madison offers what might be called two developmental paths to interest. Interest, he says, usually involves the passionate advocacy of selfish and local causes. However, there is also the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of "an enlarged and permanent interest". (pp.276) Such an interest is dedicated to the common good, for example, what is good for the people of a state, as opposed to a locality within the state, or a nation as opposed to a particular state. (See pp.299) An enlarged interest may also contemplate a longer time span: an enduring commitment or relationship to a polity which considers the long-term consequences of present actions. The struggle between local interests and broader considerations runs throughout the Federalist Papers. Madison attributes the success of the constitutional convention to "a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good." (Federalist No. 37, pp.247) Numerous passages in the Federalist Papers underline both the legitimacy of interest and the distinction between transient, or local, or emotionally driven interests, and those interests which are comprehensive, relevant to society as a whole, and infused with a time dimension that takes the future into account. This concept of interest, then, is not a mechanical process based on simple assignment of people into categories based on social class, property ownership, race, gender, etc. We can understand interest as something to be clarified and discovered as part of the political process. The authors of the Federalist Papers attempted to integrate their democratic idealism with their sober assessment of the realities of human behavior, to reconcile "a fervent attachment to Republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded". (Federalist No.49, pp.312) One feels in this document a crucial tension between an awareness of how we human beings, individually and in groups, can be egoistic, violent, shortsighted and irrational, while at the same time we have the capacity to be practical and rational, and motivated by moral and ethical ideals. It is the willingness to struggle with this full range of human potentiality, good and bad, which contributes to the greatness and depth of the authors' understanding. This willingness may be related to a working through of the depressive position. At times, during their careful delineation and defense of the constitutional safeguards erected against human frailty, the authors appear to need to remind themselves and their critics of the positive aspects of human nature and of their democratic ideals:
However, in remaining aware of the capacities for good and evil in human life, Jay, Madison and Hamilton were not simply concerned with outlining a human psychology. Their purpose in keeping such issues in constant focus was in order to design a government which would take account of this full range of behavior and provide the best possible structure for promoting human welfare. And they were concerned not only with the dangers springing from narrow interests and irrational factions, but with the dangers inherent in the democratic process--the tyranny of the majority--and from those who govern themselves:
Incorporated into this broad understanding of the human condition is a sophisticated awareness of individual and group psychology. At the individual level, emphasis is placed on narcissism as driving the leaders of factions; there are frequent references to ambition, self-love, needs for power beyond the necessity for power, narrow self-interest, and the animosities that spring from narcissistic rage. Hamilton describes opposition based on narcissistic slights:
Hamilton was aware of how narcissistic leaders may manipulate groups:
Hamilton also described the narcissistic grandiosity which can manifest itself at a group level in legislative bodies:
Madison describes the loss of personal responsibility which can occur in groups:
I have previously alluded to their awareness of the need for groups to define boundaries and enemies. As Madison put it, groups may:
There are a number of comments interspersed throughout the Federalist Papers on the influence of the size of a group on emotional contagion and decision making. In general, they believed that there was an optimal size in a decision making body, of several dozen. Less than this did not "secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion", and more led to what we would call a large group phenomena:
Madison and Hamilton also made a number of observations about psychological dynamics at a societal level. In the context of the Constitutional debates, for which their papers were written, they were very aware of the need for the government, and for those who govern, to have popular respect and support. At the same time, they were faced with the intense anxiety and fearfulness of their opponents about the authority assumed by the government, about the dangerousness of leaders, and the possibility that something might go wrong in the new republic. There were conspiracy theories, rumors that the Constitution was a plot to destroy state governments and that George Washington would be made king. They were aware of the corrosive effect on political institutions of compulsive distrust and cynicism:
The authors of the Federalist Papers were not psychoanalytically oriented organizational consultants. Nor were they therapists. They took human nature, as they understood it, as a given, and tried to think through its implications for the design of government. A description of how each aspect of the government, the separation of powers, checks and balances, the divided representative body, the role of the judiciary, etc., were to some extent rationalized and designed in terms of their theories of human nature and political behavior, would be outside the focus of this paper. In general, they believed that each governmental unit, but in particular the legislative body, had an inherent tendency to expand its power. To counteract this and retain the separateness of governmental functions, they sought ways to enlist the self-interest of governmental leaders in protecting the integrity of their own branch of government:
At the same time, they hoped to design a governmental decision making process which delayed impulsive and irrevocable decisions, allowed the issue at hand to be discussed by different branches of government from different perspectives, and allowed judicial evaluation of the constitutionality of decisions to prevent tyranny by the majority. Through these processes the clash of interests might be transmuted into the public good. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT In the decades leading up to the American Revolution, those in the colonies considered themselves part of the British Empire and shared with their counterparts in the mother country a sense of national pride and superiority about the virtues of English constitutional government. Indeed, the history of the American Revolution is in part that of a series of events in which an American majority in favor of continued political affiliation with England was gradually pushed and provoked into rebellion. To some extent the leaders of that rebellion saw themselves as asserting political principles which their English cousins had developed and fostered, and then denied. But even in this process of revolution, both the virtues of the English political system and perceptions of its failures strongly colored American beliefs about the essentials of constitutional government and its greatest dangers. (Bailyn, 1990, 1992; Morgan, 1992; Morison, 1965; Wood, 1992) Just as it is possible in America today to see current political themes and problems as in part a reflection of the events of the American Civil War 140 years ago, so it is useful to try to envision the impact on the American imagination and political understanding in 1787, at the time of the writing of the Federalist Papers, as related to events in the preceding 180 years of English political history. The resultant legacy was both powerful and contradictory. Against the backdrop of the enormous social change and economic development of the 17th century (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) occurred intense and violent political turmoil, leading to fundamental and stable political reorganization. In short, the accession of Stuart King James I in 1603 was followed by increasing monarchical tyranny and undermining of Parliamentary function; revolution and Civil War entailing the execution of Charles I; failed attempts at a purely parliamentary form of government; military dictatorship; the restoration of monarchy under Charles II with an increasingly defined and assertive role for Parliament; the collapse of these arrangements in the face of efforts by Charles II and James II to reassert the divine rights of Kings; and the frustration of James II's efforts with the renewed threat of civil war and his forced abdication, culminating in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1689 in which William of Holland and his English wife Mary were invited by Parliament to become constitutional monarchs, accompanied by the passage of the English Bill of Rights the same year. Intense political persecution was an integral part of these events, which included the torture, mutilation and execution of political leaders, Star Chamber proceedings, and military repression and slaughter at various times and places in Scotland, Ireland and England. Political conflicts were intertwined with intense religious divisions and persecution not only between Catholics and Protestants, but with equal intensity and viciousness between Anglicans, Presbyterians, and various non-conforming and dissenting Protestant groups including Quakers, most of whom vied to gain control of state power and political and military machinery in order to persecute and suppress those of other religious persuasions. Given this panorama of human misery and political difficulty, the joy, pride, and relief that the English felt by their deliverance through the Glorious Revolution and their Constitution is understandable. Americans shared this pride, but also shared the historical memory of the violence and suffering that could be inflicted in the name of government and religion. Indeed, significant portions of the American population were there precisely because of their persecution in England as non-conforming Protestants, Quakers, and Catholics. (Ashley, 1961; Terry, 1908; Trevelyan, 1942) Thus seventeenth century English politics was a full contact, blood sport. It is not hard to understand the prominent place given in the political writings of both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to physical security and protection from violence, self preservation, etc. Both delayed publication of some of their political writings; Locke published his most important political works anonymously; and both had to flee for their lives into political exile because of their writing and their political associations. Two other political theorists often cited by American Colonists also suffered harsh fates: Algernon Sidney was executed, and James Harrington's imprisonment led to madness and death. The American perception of events in England subsequent to the Glorious Revolution included a preoccupation with governmental corruption, accentuated by the frequently absentminded and frivolous way in which Colonial matters were settled, and the not infrequent incompetence of Colonial administrators. For a considerable period of time prior to the American Revolution, Americans perceived Parliament as the prime cause of their difficulties, and looked upon King George as a kindly and benevolent figure who was either misinformed or insufficiently involved on their behalf. Thus their perception was as much of parliamentary tyranny as of monarchical tyranny. According to Bailyn (1992, see esp. pp.34ff) another crucial influence on American political thinking was the savage criticism of English political corruption and betrayal of the ideals of the Glorious Revolution by radical pamphleteers of the early 18th century, such as Trenchard and Gordon, whose work circulated widely in the colonies. The lack of pre-existing government in the Colonies and the benign neglect of the mother country meant that in fact many Americans had experienced almost 150 years of self-government at the time of the coming of the American Revolution. This government was organized around states and localities, and based on charters granted by the Crown (which in two instances were converted directly into the constitutions of their respective states after the Revolution). Colonial self-government had existed long enough for American political leaders not only to have first hand experience in democratic and representative forms of government, but to be very aware of the problems and difficulties with these institutions. And Americans had their own experiences with religious intolerance and the establishment of religion. This capsule summary of a few key events in the complex history of this period in America and Britain is given to suggest several background elements influencing the psychodynamic assumptions of the designers of the U.S. Constitution about political behavior and the structure of government. The most important is the tremendous gap between ideal and reality. Balancing their pride in English constitutionalism and their egalitarian beliefs in human nature and natural law was the awareness of American political leaders of the dangers of governmental power and persecution, of the unbridled ambitions of political leaders, and the dangers of majority and parliamentary rule to religious and political freedom. That even constitutional governments could fail and deteriorate was evidenced for them by the contrast between the glory of the Glorious Revolution and their perception of corruption, ineptness and tyranny of the current English Parliament. They thus felt a need to design government structures which expressed and took account of human aspirations and ideals, of capacities for lawful, public-spirited action, while at the same time providing safeguards against the dangers known to their experience. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT* The political turmoil of England in the 17th century was accompanied by economic expansion in Europe as a whole, the continued consequences of the Reformation and Renaissance, and the _____ * My thinking in this section draws heavily upon two outstanding studies of 17th and 18th century European thought, Arthur Lovejoy's Reflections on Human Nature (1961) and Albert Hirschman's The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before it's Triumph (1977). Lovejoy explicitly discusses the theory of human nature in the American Constitution and has an extensive analysis of the concept of vanity and its variations and nuances. Hirschman analyses how concepts of the passions, interests and vanity were transmuted by thinkers of that era into an understanding of a beneficial effect of capitalism. impact of the revolution in the natural sciences. These events acted as a stimulus for new and radical thinking about human psychology and political institutions, by Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume and Adam Smith, plus a host of other thinkers now less well known. _____ These thinkers attempted to apply rational and scientific approaches to human affairs. Thomas Hobbes' wide range of interests and travels included a meeting with Galileo and familiarity with the work of Euclid and Kepler. He published works on the nature of space, matter, perception and optics, and sought to explain human nature and the state in terms of elementary propositions derived from concepts of motion. (Tuck, 1989, esp. pp.18-19) John Locke began as a physician, worked with Sydenham, and became a member of the Royal Society three years before Newton. (Dunn, 1984) Hobbes, Locke, and the other thinkers of this era looked at human behavior and institutions with fresh eyes. While in one way or another they abandoned or modified traditional religious belief, they incorporated key elements of their religious heritage into their new views. Religious introspection became psychological observation, Hobbes for example commenting in Leviathan that "the secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene, grave and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do..." (Part 1, Chapter 8) They developed secular concepts of virtue based on natural law and reason. Their understanding of "happiness" was not hedonism, but a happiness related to virtuous behavior. And evil reappeared in their understanding of human depravity. The deep religious introspection characteristic of the age carries over as a relentless examination of hidden motives. Many Enlightenment writers show impressive psychological-mindedness and sensitivity. (The tightly controlled and secretive Locke appears to be an exception.) One finding that emerges from this study runs counter to the stereotype of the Age of Enlightenment as a time of uncritical belief in reason and in the goodness and virtue of the individual. To the contrary, most thinkers of this period believed that human passions and human depravity usually overwhelm the voice of reason, and that "reason" is often a rationalization for self-interest and vanity. Their problem in the design of government was to bring frequently irrational and self-serving individuals and groups to act for the common good, or at least not to tyrannize society through the mechanism of government. (Gay, 1969, esp. pp.563-568) An example of rational analysis of irrational passion in the political arena is found in Thomas Hobbes' Behemoth or the Long Parliament, his history of the English Civil War, an event which occurred during Hobbes' lifetime and led to his exile in France. In Behemoth, Hobbes catalogued the maliciousness, spite, and emotionally driven shortsightedness of all actors in that drama. He highlighted the manipulation of religious belief, instances when passionate involvement overcame self-interest, the self-fulfilling prophecies of political leaders, and how the gullibility of the people is manipulated by preachers and priests who con them with "words not intelligible". The people mistake "boldness of affirmation" for proof of the thing affirmed. In groups, individuals will lose their capacity for independent thinking, being carried away by "the stream" of public opinion, "passionately carried away by the rest". Aggression and cruelty go beyond a strategy for the maximization of self-interest; they may involve envy, malice and covetousness, and a hatred people experience of anyone "whome they have hurt". Hobbes analyzed the political importance of emotionally loaded words, positive and negative. "King" "traitor" and "tyranny" pushed buttons and motivated political action when successfully applied to trivial and irrelevant events. Stephen Holmes, professor of political science and law at the University of Chicago, from whom these examples are taken, comments:
In Leviathan, Hobbes ascribes conflict in the state of nature to a competitive drive for superiority, not just in the service of physical self preservation and security of property, but from a variety of other motives based on vanity:
Seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers believed that the dominant irrational, unconscious passion motivating behavior was Pride, also variously termed vanity, the passion for distinction, fame, glory, and superiority. They did not always clearly delineate internal needs for self esteem from what John Adams (1790) called "the passion for distinction..the desire to be observed, considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows." (pp.26) Adams goes on to describe the permutations of the passion for distinction, such as emulation, ambition, jealousy, envy, and vanity. He adds, "The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want of nature as hunger--and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain, as the gout or stone. It sooner and oftener produces despair, and a detestation of existence...(pp.28) In part stemming from religious introspection, in which the value of a virtuous act was based on its motives, an intense search for the hidden motives of behavior led to the belief that virtuous acts, even heroic self sacrifice and humility itself, were but subtle manifestations of vanity. Some thinkers gave this a positive meaning and believed that virtuous public and political behavior could appropriately be accompanied by pride and by public distinction, and that the need for the approval of others was the mechanism for the education and support of altruistic behavior; their descriptions of this bear some resemblance to modern concepts of the ego ideal. At the group level, it was believed that a complex and multifaceted legislative process would dampen the fires of group grandiosity and impulsiveness in decision making. Further structural arrangements in government would allow the pride and self interest of office holders to defend the legitimate prerogatives of their branch of government against the incursions of other governmental functions led by equally proud and self-interested individuals: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the Constitutional rights of the place". (Madison) Thus the organization of government was explicitly designed to channel and utilize individual and group emotional pressures, to the extent that John Adams could say regarding the passion for distinction "it is the principle end of government to regulate this passion, which in its turn becomes a principle means of government". (Adams, 1790, pp.28) I have repeatedly cited John Adams because although he was not present at the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, he had a major role in its design, including his earlier efforts in preparing the first draft of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1779-1780. In addition, Adams is perhaps the most introspective and psychologically minded of the political thinkers of this era. (Shaw, 1976, Ellis, 1993) His lifelong struggle with, and ambivalence about, his own ambitions and his own intense desire for public recognition, were reflected in his political thinking. The influence of his Puritan heritage on Adams exemplifies Kohut's thesis about the fundamental Christian ambivalence in regard to self-love and self-assertion. (Kohut, 1985) Adams believed that virtuous and talented individuals who sought political power were inevitably ambitious and sought also public acclaim, recognition, and honors. The same individuals were inevitably prone to excessive vanity and ambition, and to "Avarice...Craft, Cunning, Intrigue". (cited in Shaw, pp.198) Adams studied history extensively and considered a whole range of governmental structures and policies which might help cope with "the ordinary illusions of self-love and self-interest". (Adams, 1787, in Peck, 1954, pp.141) Adams also described narcissism at the group and societal level, detailing the consequences of "national vanity or national pride" (cited in Shaw, pp.177,203. See also Adams 1790) and the group dynamics of legislative bodies, which are "...subject to fits of humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice--and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments...(and which) in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens which it will lay without compunction on its constituents...(the legislature is) apt to grow ambitious and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual." (Adams, 1776, in Peck, 1954, pp.87. See also pp.140-141) In general, it can be said that in his political theorizing Adams saw the passion for distinction as both natural, acceptable and useful, and at the same time potentially pathological and destructive. The emphasis that Adams, Madison and Hamilton placed on the psychodynamics of legislative bodies is an exception to Alford's belief that earlier political theorists did not consider group psychology. It should be noted that although this era and its thinkers are generally believed to articulate concepts of individualism, their understanding of the need for the responsiveness and approval of others as a central dynamic in human motivation gives their thinking a distinct and complex interpersonal quality. Thus John Adams:
This theme is also prominent in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith, whose 18th century writings were familiar to people like John Adams. Haraszti (1952) has shown that Adams' reflections on human vanity are based on Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). A central concept in Smith's psychology is "sympathy", which is akin to modern concepts of empathy and partial identification: "This propensity makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, and causes like passions to run, as it were by contagion..." (cited in Lovejoy, pp.258-259) Smith's description of the "principle of self-approbation and self-disapprobation" is congruent with George Herbert Mead's generalized other and with recent psychodynamic approaches (Mack, 1983; Grunebaum and Solomon, 1987):
Smith describes how this process is internalized, into a need to feel worthy of praise. In similar fashion, Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, talks about the:
Hume sees this not as a defect, but as a key mechanism through which socially valuable behavior is supported:
Hume attacked the constricted and reductionistic notion of self-love that was fashionable at that time:
Thus the conception of the individual in the 18th century was distinctly interpersonal. Individuals were not seen as isolated entities motivated by reason or passion; rather their dominant need for social confirmation was thought to lead to the internalization of group norms and the possibility of either vain or virtuous behavior. So deep was this need that "happiness" included "virtue"; passions were tamed and channeled into public life and service, and social, or governmental structures were seen as necessary for personal happiness and fulfillment.* _____ * As is well known, Rousseau offered an alternative view which perhaps unduly influences our understanding of this period. For Rousseau, the individual was idealized and romanticized in isolation from corrupting social institutions, a view which has persisted in our own century's narcissistic preoccupation with self. Guntrip pointed out many years ago that an exclusive focus on the mechanics of the isolated individual persisted in the tendency among some students of Freudian psychoanalytic thought to ignore the role of the super ego and the internalization of social norms and culture. _____ The idea of utilizing organizational structures to control and balance irrational passions for useful and virtuous ends also derived from the 18th century concept of counterpoise, the belief that it is possible to accomplish desirable results by balancing harmful passions against one another. Thus, the French essayist Vauvenargues (1715-1747) could assert that "passions are opposed to passions and one can serve as a counterweight to another" (Oeuvres Completes (Paris: Hachette, 1968) Vol.I, pp.239, cited in Hirschman, 1977, pp.27), and the doggerel verse of Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) expressed a view of counterpoise in political life shared by many contemporaries:
In part, counterpoise reflected a conception of human nature as a Newtonian outcome of vectors; in addition, it offered a secular concept of virtue, derived from an introspective awareness of human motives. The concept of counterpoise was also developed in relation to the concept of interests. In the period leading up to the design of the Constitution, the meaning of "interest" was "by no means limited to the material aspects of a person's welfare; rather, it comprised the totality of human aspirations, but denoted an element of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner in which these aspirations were to be pursued". (Hirschman, 1977) Thus a democratic governmental organization as a arena for expression of interests could also be designed through appropriate structures of government, such as delay of impulsive decision making, multiple checks and balances of the decision making process, and other forms of counterpoise, as a mechanism through which emotionally driven and self-serving interests might be tempered, delayed and balanced so as to mitigate the likelihood of harmful decisions, and increase the possibility of decisions reflecting the public interest. It was also hoped that the diversity of interests represented in the political process would work to prevent the tyranny of majorities. DISCUSSION The citation from Thomas Hobbes at the beginning of this paper states a major problem which emerges when we attempt to take the thought of another era seriously. How can we understand the thoughts and feelings of those in another time, another historical and philosophical context, even when written in the "same" language? Hobbes points out that it is difficult enough to "conjecture of the intentions" of another even when we are in their presence and are aided by non-verbal cues; it is even more difficult when we have nothing left but written materials. He offers the hope that with sufficient attention to historical context and "great prudence", the gap in understanding may be closed. Hobbes' case, and our hopes in this matter, are strengthened by the clarity and relevance of what he has to say to a problem that perplexes us in its deconstructionist version today. Just as we can understand what Hobbes is saying, whether we agree or not with his conclusion, my hopes for being able to understand the theoretical perspective of writers like Madison, Adams, and others of this time, has been strengthened by the clarity and vividness of their prose. Despite what appear to us at times as arcane and cumbersome phrases, writers of the 17th and 18th century are impressive in the power and perceptiveness of their thought, and indeed in the ease with which the issues that they identify can be related to our current concerns, and to our understanding of behavior and motivation in public and organizational life. This congruence raises an interesting question. In the effort to look at Enlightenment psychology in the light of current psychoanalytic thinking, are we attempting with our "new concepts" to reinterpret something "old", or have the "new" concepts of the 17th and 18th century become "old" as they transmogrified over the course of history into psychoanalytic thinking? Put another way, did psychoanalysis reinvent, in a deeper, expanded and more systematic form, what had been expressed in more fragmentary form before, and is psychoanalysis itself part of an historical tradition that flows from the Enlightenment and from the religious introspection of the Reformation? While the answer to this question is beyond the scope and focus of this paper, I mention it here to suggest that the continuity, if it exists, may provide a rationale for examining the similarities and differences between present and past understandings of human behavior. Are there some perspectives and insights which might be currently valuable to us, that have inadvertently become extinct in the evolution of past to present? The paradoxes of Federalist thought about government mentioned earlier are a reflection of the complex and conflicted nature of individuals, groups and societies. Madison, Adams and Hamilton took account of the full range of behavior and motivation contemplated by psychoanalytic and group dynamic concepts, although they did not elaborate their insights as a theory, but used them ad hoc. They utilized a tripartite model of human functioning, which has some similarities to psychoanalytic structural theory: People are capable of practical and realistic planning and action, which can be embodied in social structures, most evident in the design of the Constitution itself. Passions can overcome reason in both individuals and groups. The interpersonal concept of the individual embodied in the Federalist also encompasses ego ideals, which transcend narrow personal or local interests, and contemplates wider social and generational boundaries. The central role given "the passion for distinction" links individuals to groups and group psychodynamics. In legislative groups, impulsive decision making based on transient inclinations and emotionally-driven concerns can be transmuted into concerns for wider social boundaries and longer time spans of responsibility. But thought and decision making can also be dominated by emotionally driven processes that involve primitive forms of narcissism, splitting, irrational thinking, and group contagion. Individual and group interests are legitimate, and it is the purpose of democratic governments to reflect them; but interests taken collectively are also problematic, and can be perverted in all the ways that the Federalists foresaw. The Federalists used the term factions to describe group political behavior dominated by narrow interests, primitive splitting, and narcissistic leadership. We can reflect on the predominant role of narcissism in the political thought of the 18th century in light of current psychoanalytic thinking about the relationship of leaders and groups. Despite their theoretical differences, both Kohut and Kernberg have given narcissism a central role in the reciprocal dynamics of leader and group in political situations. Just as Adams, Kohut emphasizes the co-existence of positive and negative dimensions of narcissistic dynamics in public life:
Both Kernberg and Kohut emphasize the mutual seduction and regressive pull of narcissistic tendencies in leaders and groups. Kernberg (1991) speaks of the leader's need for a healthy level of narcissism, realistic paranoia, talent, competence, professional sentience, and moral values as aids, along with appropriate organizational structures, in resisting narcissistic regression and corruption. He also discusses--and this is indirectly related to the framers' concern with balance in government--the need for an appropriate level of power and authority in relation to the task at hand for the leadership of various organizational structures. Kernberg also emphasizes the importance of appropriate governmental structures generally in preventing regressive tendencies, just as Adams, for example, was preoccupied with the need for a bicameral rather than unicameral legislative body in preventing impulsive group decision making under the sway of ambitious and talented leaders. It is interesting to note that Kernberg, Kohut and Rangell, psychoanalysts who have been among the most thoughtful and productive in contributing to our understanding of organizational dynamics, all start with their experience of leadership roles in psychoanalytic organizations. Kohut (1985, pp.53) reflects on how minor narcissistic slights may become transformed into intractable theoretical schisms. Rangell's reflections (1974) on the splits occurring within psychoanalytic organizations led him to an interest in political phenomena. His intensive study of Nixon and Watergate led him to the concept of the "compromise of integrity". He comments, "In the neuroses the id is sacrificed; in psychosis, reality; in compromise of integrity, the superego gives." The conflict between the ego and the superego which results in a compromise of integrity is propelled by "uncontrollable and unsatisfied narcissism. Subsumed under the latter are the totality of ego interests...". Rangell concludes, in tones reminiscent of John Adams, "Narcissism unbridled is the enemy of integrity." I have presented examples of the introspectiveness and psychological mindedness of 17th and 18th century thinkers. As they relate to political and economic matters, these thinkers tend to be more concerned with the relation of motives to behavior, and less preoccupied with the relationship of affects and motives to fantasy, than we in our clinical and group relations work are inclined to be. Perhaps because of the fact that they did not start with a clinical perspective, and did not see individual or group health as a goal, the authors of the Constitution "did not so much preach to Americans about what they ought to do, as to predict successfully what they would do, supposing certain governmental mechanisms were (or were not) established". (Lovejoy, 1961) They attempted to establish organizational roles, functions and boundaries which would be effective and productive in terms of the givens of human nature as they understood them. The contrast between our current tendencies to take a normative and even at times utopian perspective with regard to organizational functioning, and these efforts at organizational design based on a quite sober assessment of human nature, is certainly worth thinking about in giving us perspective on our own work. Because so much of the work of psychoanalytically oriented practitioners takes place in clinical or group relations setting, and so much of our theory is derived from these sources, it may be the case that we have not fully integrated economic and organizational interests, as well as social ideals, into our thinking. We may have a tendency to reduce problems to relational and psychodynamic issues, rather than to take sufficiently into account the reality and motivation of real world commitments, interests and problems. In this sense, I believe that a study of the Federalist Papers may provoke some new thinking on our part about how we can deal with the reality, and the validity, of diverse interests, without ourselves descending into scapegoating, excessive moralizing, and utopian thinking. The concept of interests does not seem to have a parallel in a psychoanalytic theory. Interests are overdetermined, representing planful behavior related not only to external realities but to multiple levels of the psyche. Purely economic goals are not interests but abstractions. They become interests when they are clothed with pride, ambition, group and social ideals, and purposes. Ego ideals may be expressed as dreams and utopias; they may be articulated comprehensively as ideologies; but when they are expressed in action they become interests, and become amalgamated with other psyche levels. Intensely felt personal needs, when expressed, are passions, or when enacted, impulses; but when passions organize behavior over time in the pursuit of goals, they too become interests. The concept of interests may be used as a bridging concept to relate individual and group needs and purposes to organizational roles, the primary task of an organization, and the functions of organizational and political structures. Working backwards, interests may be analyzed in terms of all of their contributing components. The question, "What are this person's (or group's) interests?" becomes an analytic tool. Hopefully, the concept of interests can also become a non-judgmental approach to understanding participation in organizational processes. Like ego functions, interests attempt to be adaptive and can be assessed in terms of their success in achieving understandable and worthwhile human goals. Like narcissism, they are both an essential and healthy component of everyday life, and a possible source of difficulty when expressed in primitive and distorted form.
INTERESTS, PASSIONS AND POLITICS: PSYCHODYNAMIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, John, On Self-Delusion (1763) In: Papers of John Adams, I, pp. 78-81, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977. ------, The Political Writings of John Adams, George A. Peek, Jr., (ed.) Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1954. Adams, John, and Jefferson, Thomas, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, Lester J. Cappon (ed.), University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1959. ------, Discourses on Davila: A Series of Papers on Political History (1790) DaCapo Press, New York, 1973. Alford, C. Fred, Group Psychology and Political Theory, Yale, 1994. Ashley, Maurice, England in the Seventeenth Century (1603-1714), Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1961. Bailyn, Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, enlarged ed., 1992 ------, Faces of Revolution: Personalities and Themes in the Struggle for American Independence, Knopf, 1990; Vintage, 1992. Banning, Lance, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995. Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958. Currie, David, The Constitution of the United States: A Primer for the People. Curtis, Merle E., Human Nature in American Thought: A History, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, E169.1 CS77, 1980. ------, Chapter 4, The Great Mr. Locke, America's Philosopher 1783-1861, In:Probing our Past, Harper, New York, E169, C885, 1955. DeConde, Alexander, William Vans Murray's Political Sketches: A Defense of the American Experiment. Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41: pp. 623-640, 1954-1955. DeGrazia, Alfred, Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups, Ulmer, S. Sidney (ed.) pp.199-209. In: Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1961. Drescher, Seymour, Econocide: British Slavery in the ERA of Abolition, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1977. ------, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, c1986, 1987. Dunn, John, Locke, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984. ------, The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1969. ------, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century In: John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, Yolton, J.W., (ed.) Cambridge, 1969. Ellis, Joseph, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams, W.W. Norton, New York, 1993. Elshtain, Jean Bethke, Democracy on Trial, Basic Books, 1995. ------, In Common Together: Unity, Diversity, and Civic Virtue. The Constitution of the People In: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society, Calvert, Robert E. (ed.), University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1991. Elson, Miriam (ed.), The Kohut Seminars on Self Psychology and Psychotherapy with Children and Young Adults, W.W. Norton, New York, 1987. Gay, Peter, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation-The Science of Freedom, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, New York, 1969. Grunebaum, Henry, and Solomon, Leonard, Peer Relationships, Self-Esteem and the Self, Int. J. Group Psychotherapy 37: pp. 475-513, 1987. Guntrip, Harry J.S., Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy, and the Self, Basic Books, New York, 1971. (See esp. Ch.2) Hamilton, Alexander; Jay, John; and Madison, James, The Federalist Papers, (1788). Edited with an Introduction by Isaac Kramnick. Penguin Classics, 1987. Hanly, Charles M.T., Ideology and Psychoanalysis Rangell, Leo, and Moses-Hrushovslu, Rena, (eds.), In: Psychoanalysis at the Political Border: Essays in Honor of Rafael Moses. ------, The Problem of Truth in Applied Psychoanalysis, Guilford Publications, New York, 1992. Haraszti, Zoltan, John Adams, The Prophets of Progress, Harvard University Press, 1952. Hirschman, Albert O., The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1977. Hobbes, Thomas, Behemoth or the Long Parliament, 2nd Ed. (1668), Ferdinand Tonnies (ed.), London, 1889. Reprinted with an Introduction by Stephen Holmes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990. ------, Leviathan (1651), Michael Oakeshott (ed.) with an Introduction by Richard S. Peters, London, MacMillan, 1962. ------, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, with Three Lives, edited with an Introduction by J.C.A. Gaskin, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. Holmes, Stephen, Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth In: Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, Dietz, Mary G. (ed.) University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1990. ------, Passion and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, JC 574, .H65 1955. ------, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993. Howe, Daniel W., The Political Psychology of the Federalist, William and Mary Quarterly 44: pp. 485-509, 1987. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, The Open Court Publishing Company, LaSalle, IL., 1953.(1777) Isaac, Eric, God's Acre, In: The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man, Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley, (eds.) Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1969. Kernberg, Otto F., The Moral Dimensions of Leadership, In: Psychoanalytic Group, Theory and Therapy: Essays in Honor of Saul Scheidlinger, Saul Tuttman, (ed.) International Universities Press, Madison, CT, pp. 87-112, 1991. Koch, Adrienne, Power, Morals and the Founding Fathers: Essays in the Interpretation of the American Enlightenment, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1961. Kohut, Heinz, On Leadership, In: Self Psychology and the Humanities: Reflections on a New Psychoanalytic Approach Edited with an Introduction by Charles Sarozien, W.W. Norton, New York, pp. 51-72, 1985. Kramnick, Issac, The Discourse of Politics in 1787: The Constitution and Its Critics on Individualism, Community, and the State In: To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, Belz, Hoffman and Albert (eds.) University Press of Virginia, 1992. Lerner, Ralph, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution Beyond Confederation In: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, Beeman, Richard, et al., (eds.), North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1987. Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (ed. and Introduction by Peter Laslett), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1960. Lovejoy, Arthur O., Essays in the History of Ideas, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1948. ------, Reflections on Human Nature, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1961. McCoy, Drew R., The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989. Macpherson, C.B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. Mack, John E., Self-Esteem and its Development: An Overview, In: The Development and Sustaining of Self-Esteem in Childhood, J.E. Mack and S.L. Ablon, (eds.), International Universities Press, New York, pp. 1-42, 1983. Madison, James, Property In: The Papers of James Madison, National Gazette, March 27, 1792, Vol.14, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1983. ------, The Forging of American Federalism, (Selected Writings), Harper Torchbooks, The Academy Library, New York, 1953. Matthews, Richard K., If Men were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. Meyers, Marvin, A Commentary on Publius-Madison In: The Hofstadter Aegis, A Memorial 1916 RH 1970: Founding and Revolution, Elkins, Stanley and McKitrick, Eric (eds.) Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974. Morgan, Edmund S., The Birth of the Republic 3rd Ed., 1763-1789. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992. Morison, Samuel Eliot, The Oxford History of the American People, Oxford University Press, New York, (See esp. Ch. 12-14, pp. 18 & 20), 1965. Murrin, John M., Fundamental Values, The Founding Fathers, and the Constitution, In: To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, Belz, Hoffman and Albert (eds.) University Press of Virginia, 1992. Nedelsky, Jennifer, The Protection of Property in the Origins and Development of the American Constitution In: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, Belz, Hoffman and Albert (eds.) University Press of Virginia, 1992. Novak, Michael, How to Make a Republic Work: The Originality of the Commercial Republicans. In: The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society. Calvert, Robert E. (ed.), University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1991. Pangle, Thomas L., The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Post Modern Age, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992. Peabody, James Bishop, (ed.) John Adams: A Biography in His Own Words, Harper and Row, New York, 1973. Pole, J.R., The Individualist Foundations of American Constitutionalism In: To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, Belz, Hoffman and Albert (eds.) University Press of Virginia, 1992. Rakove, Jack N., Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, Knopf, 1996. Rangell, Leo, A Psychoanalytic Perspective Leading Currently to the Syndrome of the Compromise of Integrity, Int. J.J. Psycho-anal SS:3-12, 1974. Reid, John Phillip, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988. Rice, A.K., Individual Group and Intergroup Processes, Human Relations 22: 565-584. Rosenberg, Nathan, and Birdzell, L.E., Jr., How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World, Basic Books, New York, 1986. Ross, Dorothy, The "New History" and the "New Psychology": An Early Attempt at Psychology In: The Hofstadter Aegis, A Memorial 1916 RH 1970: Founding and Revolution:,Elkins, Stanley and McKitrick, Eric (eds.) Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) trans. Donald Press, Introduction, James Miller, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1992. Rutland, Robert A., James Madison: The Founding Fathers, MacMillan, New York, 1987. Shaw, Peter, The Character of John Adams, University of North Carolina Press, 1976. Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, (1759), 1976. Sowell, Thomas, A Conflict of Vision: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1987. ------, Knowledge and Decisions, Basic Books, New York, 1980. Stacey, Ralph D., Complexity and Creativity in Organizations, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, CA, 1996. Storing, Herbert J., What the Anti-Federalists were for, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981. Swogger, Glenn Jr., Group Self-Esteem and Group Performance In: The Psychodynamics of Organizations, Larry Hirschhorn and Carol K. Barnett, (eds.), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, pp. 99-117, 1993. ------, The Open Society and its Discontents: Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Environmental Concerns, Technology, Journal of the Franklin Institute, 331A: 67-75 (1994). Terry, Benjamin, A., History of England, 4th Ed., Revised, Scott, Foresman & Co., Chicago, 1908. Trevelyan, G.M., A Shortened History of England, Penguin Books, London, (1942), 1987. Tuck, Richard, Hobbes, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989. -------, Hobbes and Locke on Toleration In: Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, Dietz, Mary G., (ed.) University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1990. Wedgwood, C.V., Oliver Cromwell, Barnes & Noble, 1973. (1939) Williams, Aubrey, (ed.) Poetry and Prose of Alexander Pope, Houghton Mifflin Company, Riverside Editions, Boston, 1969. Wills, Gary, Introduction and Notes to Federalist Papers, Bantam Books, New York, 1982. Wood, Gordon S., The Radicalism of the American Revolution, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1992. ------, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution In: Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, Beeman, Richard, et al., (eds.), North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1987. Yarbrough, Jean, The Constitution and Character: The Missing Critical Principle? In: To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution, Belz, Hoffman and Albert (eds.) University Press of Virginia, 1992.
|
|||
 |
|||