| Social Dependency
Mechanisms: A case study of Toyota, Hirose factory, Japan.
Joichi R.Ogawa, Ph.D.
Introduction |
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No introduction of the dynamics of Toyota and its workers can be truly understood without an adequate grasp of the underlying cultural structures of the Japanese social dependency mechanism, which includes a historical cultural perspective; a socio-economic perspective; as well as a political and hierarchical perspective. When dealing with organization interventions the main theme that I would like to emphasize is the social dependency mechanism that exists within the structure of the workplace. I want to focus on the hidden cultural aspects that exist within the work group and that is augmented by management, that is recognizing the tendency towards an up/down social dependency, blue collar workers are trapped by upper management into participating in a traditional, yet outdated social mechanism, namely the futile organizational hierarchy.
Historical Cultural
It is important to remember that Japan is essentially a “Rice Culture”, and has been so for many centuries. That although currency and financial transactions are an every-day part of modern Japanese economic reality, rice remains an important socio-economic commodity, one that is not traded, but culturally valued . The value of rice and its production has long been in the direct control of the government. From Futile times regulations regarding production, land right, and distribution have been strictly regulated by the regional and national governments. Farmers, who have traditionally been the supporting structure of the nation, have long been revered as well as exploited by the ruling classes of earlier times.
Socio-economic
In the modern world of Japan farmers still play a key role in the socio-economic structure of society. Many farmers since the late 60’s receive a financial “bounty” or compensation for not developing their rice fields, because Japan, who has an excessive rice surplus, needs to regulate the amount of rice entering into the market. At the same time, since rice is the principle food of the Japanese people and since the government is responsible for the stock piling of emergency rations for the entire population, the Japanese government is obligated to buy up all the production of rice from farmers throughout the entire country. Although, the purchase price of rice remains substantially high in order to protect the farmers, the market price of rice is equally high for the consumers. It is the government who sets the price standard for productivity and distribution to both protect the interests and tradition of the farmers and to make a substantial profit in the marketplace. Nonetheless the farmers are caught between low productivity and increased debt. Thus the farmer is at the mercy of the government’s rice policy, and the whole country is the victim of the dual standard of protectionism and price gouging by the regulating agencies. These same regulating agencies also limit the importation of rice from other countries, allowing a minimum of off-shore rice to enter Japan, and when it is accepted it is heavily taxed in order to protect the domestic farmers. Further, the farmers themselves have gone into debt, purchasing essential large-scale equipment and biochemicals to make the Spring and Fall planting and harvesting seasons as productive as possible. This leaves them with huge outstanding loans and with over three quarters of the year with low-yield or no yield crop maintenance.
Political Hierarchical
The shadow side of the successful competitive marketing strategies of Toyota is hidden in the Futile labor-management relations, which might be seen metaphorically as a baron-peasant or dominant/recessive positioning within the company. Not surprisingly, this is a direct mirroring of the Japanese government’s traditional control of rice crop reduction in agricultural productivity. Many farmers are opting for part-time employment in big companies such as Toyota, since their fields are either lying fallow or need low maintenance during non-planting, non-harvesting seasons. At the same time, a good deal of reciprocity is taking place between the Japanese farmers, who constitute a large political faction and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who represent almost single-handedly the ruling faction of the Diet. This mutual reciprocation has been in place for nearly fifty years, and there seems little signs of developing a more independent congruency between Japanese farmers and the political factions which they support.
What this means for the hierarchy in Toyota’s management is that they view the blue collar part-time farm worker as a valuable asset. After all, he is a good worker, he is tough, he is resilient and uncomplaining about work schedules and assigned tasks, and, most importantly, he is satisfied with the low wage that Toyota pays their industrial labor force. This, of course, is the perfect Baron-peasant work strategy., time-honored, dependable, productive, and completely medieval. This would not seem to bother these unskilled technicians, as they are primarily focused on the long term effects of sustained employment. From the worker’s perspective, they are receiving a subsidized bounty from the Japanese government, and they are guaranteed a fixed wage over an extended length of time from a well-established manufacturing company, which, in effect will help them to repay their outstanding farm loans.
The Problem of the Social Dependency Mechanism
This homogeneous labor force is highly conservative and supportive of the management hierarchy, to a point. In fact, it would not normally be a mechanism for cultural discontent. After all, the system is in place; the management has what it wants – workers who work hard for little pay and high productivity; and the technicians have what they want – secure long term employment with a guaranteed fixed wage. However, the underlying structure of this medieval system seems to have crumbled right out from under Toyota’s control. Loyal workers who should be content with assignments and restructuring of departments have developed a fight-flight response to an unprecedented reorganization and modernization of the work force.
How did this come about? Why did an otherwise contented work force break down so utterly and completely over a simple company procedure? Why did the workers just say “no”? The developing presenting problem and Toyota’s familial response to it comprise the body of this paper. I will introduce background information for Toyota’s productivity and their concern for the developing issues around a specific branch office in Hirose. And I will describe the treatment interventions which helped to evaluate and inform these traditional old-style workers who attempted a counter reformation reaction. I will conclude with the results and implications of Toyota’s effectiveness in resolving an otherwise inflammatory and potentially destructive situation.
Background and Presenting Issue
The high quality of Toyota's automobiles is internationally known for its reliability and its excellent fuel efficiency. The manifested secret of the competitiveness of Toyota Corporation is found in its unique manufacturing systems: such as Lean Product System, Just in Time, Kanban, Kaizen, QC Circle, etc.. Additionally, the computer-related parts and computer-controlling systems in the assembly process, have also supported the competitive power of Toyota Corporation in world markets, especially in the U.S. market.
In a domestic and historical sense, Toyota has traditionally maintained its reign as the lord of a feudalistic-type of automobile manufacturing “kingdom,” with a vassal-like relationship with all its subsidiary companies. About ten years ago, the relationship between Toyota and one of its “vassal” companies made a turn for the worse. This development is referred to as the "Revolution of Nippon-Denso." Nippon Denso was a small company, which had been supplying all of the electronics and computer-related parts to Toyota for over 20 years. Nippon-Denso was forced to export some of its products to a foreign company to make up for lost profits. This went against the established rules of Toyota. The traditional relationship with Nippon Denso was terminated and Toyota subsequently decided to found electronics division from within for the first time in its history.
The newly founded electronics division, composed of three departments, including research & development, production technique, and manufacturing, was organized with engineers gathered from within the company almost by force. The major complicating factor was that not only did the workers not have a choice in transferring to a new division, nor sufficient training for new positions, but also, the general manager of the division demonstrated a distinct despotic and fanatic personality style. Largely due the manager’s dominant personality, he was able to push this project through against all odds within the corporation. It is also fair to state that without his arrogant and controlling leadership style, which is a rarity in Japanese mainstream culture, this urgent and significant restructuring would never have been accomplished as quickly as it was. Interestingly enough, this same general manager later was to play a key political role in introducing a non-Toyota outsider to fill the prominent position of President.
The result of all these factors coming together had enormous psychological and emotional impact on the adjustment of the division’s workers, namely they had to endure numerous problems under worse working conditions than any other divisions of the corporation.
Psychological Deconstruction and Emotional Re-framing Approach Evaluation
Ten years ago, Dr. Joichi Ogawa was invited to lecture at a seminar given by the Chubu Chamber of Industry. It was at that time that he was asked by the then Electronics Division middle-manager Naoki Noda (currently general manager of Toyota, Japan) to consult on the problems at Toyota’s Hirose factory.
A survey of employee morale, administered by Dr. Ogawa with the cooperation and permission of Toyota’s Personnel Department strongly indicated an extremely low Index of Job Satisfaction among all the employees of the Electronics Division.
Procedure
In-depth interviews were conducted with all 400 employees of the Electronics Division. After two months using the K-J Method of analysis, a pattern of apathy was assessed. (n.b. The K-J Method was developed by Kawakita Jiro, a social anthropologist, as a sorting system for group problem-solving and to promote discussion and psychological processing)
The in-depth analysis further indicated: problems of extended working hours, advanced age, lack of re-training and a general insufficiency of electronic engineering skills; it also revealed an underlying feature that was present in almost all division employees, namely an overwhelming lack of enthusiasm and motivation driven by the conflict presented between the desire to build automobiles and the pressure to produce effective computer component support. The tragedy was that these employees had joined Toyota to manufacture cars and none of them were interested in making computers, as a result, there was no internal motivation among them.
Additionally, analysis revealed that there was no communication between the top executives and the R&D and production/manufacturing staff. Because of the disruption coming from the above mentioned general manager, middle management was unable to mediate the increasingly powerful barrier of misunderstandings between top and bottom, i.e. administration and workers. In this atmosphere of apathy and intense emotionality, no matter which method for improvement was implemented, such as QC Circle, Kanban, or Kaizen (quality control, signed checklist, and product improvement), the implementation was never successful.
Intervention
1)
Clinical Intervention Theory Application Dr. Ogawa's approach was to apply the method of group psychotherapy: create a safe container, to encourage the employee group members to speak their own individual truth, and share the common problems within the safe container of informal group settings. His goal was to get them to verbalize the pathological work situation, and build consensus within the group. Outcomes After dissolving frustration (having merry times with drinks in after hours settings), individual group members were able to recognize that they were sharing the same dissatisfactions. Arriving at consensus, they were finally able to take the chance to improve the internal motivation of the entire division by means of forming several task-force, goal-oriented focus groups. They were willing to identify the fight/flight phase between middle-managers and workers and begin to take steps to resolve individual issues. The result was that cohesiveness and productivity would gradually improve.
2) Didactic Intervention All employees of the Electronics Division attended lectures on the subject of management problem-solving. There were also presentations and discussions of other corporate solutions, including merging, hiring away (using head hunters), and supplemental training and education. Case examples of the problem-solving of other Omega companies were utilized.
3) Workshop Intervention After focused interaction in initial small group settings, all the employees came together and designed strategies for improvement. The result was a proposal which, accompanied by a signed petition, the employees presented directly to the president of Toyota.
4) The effect of the proposal was as follows: Head-hunters: Hiring away established middle management from such companies as Pioneer, NEC, Toshiba, and Nippon-Denso. Step Up Project: Company wide incentive for transfer in to the Electronics Division. Utilization of female employee potential: Advancement opportunities offered to women section leaders and engineers who might prefer computer electronics. Inviting an executive consultant from the Toyota Osaka Plant, who is referred to as “Kamisama,” or the “Spirit of Quality Control Circle Activity”. Replacement of the general manager of the Electronics Division (bold move). Additional financial compensation for overtime work (revolutionary move). Recruitment of Electronics major students: Right out of colleges, universities and other graduate institutes. Funding for and up-grading of R&D equipment. Abolishment of "Kanban" system (assembly-line signed checklist system).
Conclusion
As a result of this bottom-up proposal, many of the items were implemented. And today, the Electronics Division of Toyota is operating much more efficiently, its productivity has improved enormously. Individual workers have greater job satisfaction, improvement of quality control, cost reduction and the increased reliability of electronic component parts has resulted in the continued excellence that is a hallmark of the Toyota Corporation.
From the earliest stage, Toyota has always had a strong sense of family, including a view toward individual cooperation and cohesiveness within the workforce. Although corporate relations collapsed momentarily and the overall production seriously declined, in some cases as much as 50%. Toyota was able to recover the cooperative, filial arrangement of the organization, keeping the social community intact, while at the same time demonstrating an innovative re-framing of the emotional structure of the workforce without loss of manpower, prestige or significant capital. This is a phenomenal milestone in Japanese corporate communications and employee relations. References:
Besser, T. L. (1996). Team Toyota: Transplanting the Toyota Culture to the Camry Plant in Kentucky, State University of New York Press
Fujimoto, T. (1999). The Evolution of a Manufacturing Systems at Toyota, Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Monden, Y. (1998). Toyota Production System: An Integrated Approach to Just-in-Time Engineering and Management Press,
Nonaka, Ikujiro & Takeuchi, Hirotaka (1995). The knowledge-creating company: how Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation. Oxford University Press
Ohno, T. (1988). Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production, Productivity Press Inc
Pascale, R. T. & Athos, A. G. (1981). The Art of Japanese Management: Applications for American Executives. Warner Books
The hidden secrets of Toyota's cost management |
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