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Rafael Moses, M.D. and Rena Moses-Hrushovski,
Ph.D. |
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* We use the term collaborators in spite of its other unpleasant and off-putting meaning as a person who collaborates with the enemy.
The data We are basing ourselves on our own experiences with a variety of joint projects in the past 20-25 years. i.e. even before the first peace treaty, that between Israel and Egypt, was signed in 1981. Naturally, after that more joint projects were initiated, and even more after the Oslo accords, and finally the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Some projects succeeded more, some less, but we believe that most had some measure of success and that, additionally, we can learn equally from failures as from successes. We are also making use of information gleaned from the work of projects carried out by other workers, particularly in recent years, whether directly or through publications. A good part of our knowledge and experience in recent years comes from working through and with the Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Through this Center we have been involved in projects with academic centers in the Jerusalem area and in Gaza. We also used data gleaned in a recent meeting at the Truman Center of teams from Hebrew University who have been engaged in such collaborative projects. The situation We are dealing here with professional, i.e. intellectual people from two opposing sides, who come together for a joint project. A working relationship is formed because they want to cooperate for the mutual benefit of both the participants and their groups. An additional motivation often, but not always, is to encourage collaboration between these two or more groups. Yet - at the same time they are on opposite sides, are enemies and thus share all the feelings that are engendered at various times about enemies, even though often they will not want to think about that. Unconscious, or less conscious, motivations obviously are often also operative, such as: the wish to prove that the other side is wrong; to justify themselves because of guilt feelings and perhaps to attack the other; or a wish to punish and take revenge, be it more subtly or more blatantly. Political motivations - both conscious and unconscious - can also often be discerned. We believe that projects carried out by participants from two opposing groups are basically similar, i.e. they show many of the same characteristics, of collaboration between any two groups or institutions anywhere. Only here, when political enemies come together for cooperating, the characteristics of such collaboration are more extreme, more marked and therefore more visible. Yet in our view these are basically parallel processes. In other words, we expect here to meet the same problems, the same conscious and unconscious reactions, feelings and conflicts - only more sharply and clearly discernible than the more attenuated way of any collaboration between individuals and groups generally. Perception of "External" obstacles These go together with the impact of politics - most starkly seen when there is an event, e.g. a terrorist attack on Jews or the wanton killing of Arabs by Jewish individuals ( the most extreme example of which was the massacre in the Hebron mosque); or a Palestinian violent demonstration where Israeli soldiers kill or wound Palestinians and may themselves, though more rarely, be wounded or even killed. In the face of such an "event", each member on each side is pushed into his/her more nationalistic, extreme, fanatic position. He is brought back to politically identifying more with the group which he here represents and identifying less with the new bilateral group that has been formed. In that sense, this phenomenon is akin to what happens in negotiations between two political groups. We see the same polarization take place at a Palestinian-Israeli meeting or conference both when: the media come in and thus create an atmosphere of going public; but also when the participants meet in a large rather than a small group. Then each participant is pushed into the more political "party line", i.e. the more extreme position - which can more easily be given up when one meets tête-à-tête or in a small group. The political situation with its concomitant instability which has been in existence in our area for a long period of time and even more so the present acute stalemate in the peace process, (in the past two years), which give rise to much uncertainty both for the individual - again on both sides - and for both groups which the individuals continuously represent, again more or less consciously, more or less intensely at different times. Such uncertainty exists constantly even though its intensity varies at different times. As such it is an ongoing potentially disturbing factor. Another factor which is very evident but not much talked about in this context is the ongoing impact of death on all members of both groups. An awareness of the ubiquitousness of untimely death is there in almost all Palestinians and Israelis. Until some 20-25 years ago, the impact of death on individuals and families in Israel was not much talked about. However, the social climate here has changed considerably (cf Moses 1982). And yet, the fact that death is so often in people’s minds has not affected the examination of relations between enemies. One additional consequence of such uncertain and unstable situations is that they are very much prone to produce rumors, as we know also from political life in general and from intergroup events in group relations conferences. Such rumors begin on one side, the side which the rumor affects; sometimes they are communicated from one side to the other. But they undoubtedly increase the insecurity of partners on both sides to a greater degree at specific times. This is more so when such rumors are not communicated to those of the other side - thus increasing the emotional distance between the collaborators. Examples are most obvious and strong during wars: the 6-Day-War: the Israelis developed rumors of their land being occupied, women raped, men killed; the Yom Kippur or October War when in Israel rumors circulated that went in both directions: terrible losses, that the Syrians who had occupied the Golan heights at first would penetrate down to the Sea of Galilee; but also more positive rumors for Israel coming out in the second phase when the Israeli army took the offense in the Sinai. Finally in the Gulf War in 1991 there were rumors that the Palestinians were totally helpless and destitute, vulnerable to gas attacks without adequate protection against them. On the Israeli side there were rumors about scud missile carrying chemical or biological warfare implements. On both sides, rumor then describe dangers of near annihilation of the side where the rumor arises. Other difficulties perceived as "external" related, e.g. to the setting up of meetings - among them ‘you need a "neutral" place. to meet in’. Some feel that the beginning is particularly difficult. Also, each side often feels that the other side procrastinates especially at that time. A further practical question arises: What happens if on the day of the meeting a closure of the "territories" occurs or is in effect ? This means that Palestinians cannot come out of their area or in some cases even move from one to another area of theirs. A frequent solution suggested is to have the meeting in a Palestinian area - which then introduces an asymmetry - the meeting is no longer ‘neutral’ but is on one side’s territory - and to emotional ractions reactions to that from both sides. Political limitations are sometimes imposed on the holding of bilateral meetings, mainly from the Palestinian and Arab side, who still use lack of recognition as a political weapon. This was very widespread before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.- with his emphasis on the large part in the conflict of the psychological barriers - when non-recognition was dominant in international forums, in diplomatic meetings and more. Most Palestinian universities nowadays have a policy that they should not collaborate with Israeli universities - though this is by no means strictly enforced. The same phenomenon is also very evident in Jordan and Egypt, where a number of professional organizations - e.g. the Medical Association and the Association of lawyers - have come out with clearcut unequivocal declarations: not to collaborate with Israelis and not to visit Israel. People who do so in spite of this proscription are sometimes boycotted or retaliated against. In some cases the counterpart in Jordan or Egypt is afraid to receive phone calls or faxes from the Israeli partner lest this brands him as a collaborator in the second sense. In Egypt there is said to be a blacklist of Israelis not allowed into the country. Whether this belongs in the category of rumors is unclear. In order to understand this asymmetry we must remind ourselves that politically, Israel and Israelis are interested in maximizing bi- or multilateral contacts, while on the Palestinian and Arab side holding off on such meetings can similarly be used as a political move, because they feel that to collaborate will be understood as an acceptance of the currently existing asymmetrical status quo, i.e. Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other lands and all that this implies. Difficulties seen more directly as "psychological" There is a need to hold on to things familiar in order to defend against the fear of the unknown, there are vague anxieties related to entering a new situation, unfamiliar territory and meeting with the "enemy". Concrete forms of this, for the Palestinian, are the fear of going through road blocks manned by Israeli soldiers. How will they treat me ? I will most probably be humiliated as I have been in the past. The very checkpost itself is a humiliation, where Israelis are waved through and Palestinians stopped, their identity checked, their cars examined. And even if how this is done, in what manner, with what attitude varies, from one checkpost to another, it is always unpleasant, humiliating and painful. On the Israeli side there are fears of a different kind: many Israelis fear - some more, some less - to go into Palestinian territory - be it Gaza or Bethlehem or Ramallah. Will I be safe ? What can happen to me ? My wife/husband/children will fear for me and not let me go. Sometimes the collaborator emphasizes his/her family’s fear to hide his own anxieties. Another "psychological" difficulty is a tendency to patronize the other, particularly when a partner feels stronger in some way than the other, this may occur on a variety of levels - professional, organizational, moral, etc. We will refer to this in more detail later. "Cultural" differences In some cases, it is felt that a social interaction is requested or almost required to facilitate the working together, when this was not expected at all; that it leads to a greater involvement than anticipated, also of the family, a participation in family events - such as births, wedding or mourning not related to political events - of a partner on the other side. This may lead to a quite close relationship. Thus one partner said to the other: "You are like my brother. With you I’d go anywhere." Sometimes it is felt that a project participant has to pass a series of tests until she/he is - more or less - accepted by the partners from the other side. A further example came up when it was proposed to make joint condolence and grief visits on the other side, that there were cultural differences in patterns of mourning, which had to be learned and understood before such visits could be made. Making behavioral mistakes related to cultural differences - gaffes - is an important and well-known phenomenon between many different cultural groups in cooperation, negotiation and more. Sometimes, a cultural value makes its appearance in that members of a team feel strongly that they have to defend and stand by their "friends", their "family", their "group" , at the expense of expressing their own views or feelings. In other words, loyalty is of paramount importance and pushes aside acts or contents that focus on joint achievements of the bilateral group. Many of the partners on both sides feel strongly that it is the personal contacts and relationship that ensure an ongoing continuity rather than the formal relationships between the sponsoring institutions. Yet the institutions are also very important: for example, it was felt that to collaborate as a representative of a non-governmental organization (NGO) creates easier conditions than as a representative of a government. The latter is often more bureaucratic and more susceptible to political pressures. In other instances, the problem arises because the reverse of the more intensive personal contact comes about: there is an implicit demand that the relationship must confine itself strictly to professional meetings - while social contacts, e.g. in the partners‘ private homes - are very much or even absolutely discouraged. At times there is even a demand that each team work on its own and then come together to compare write-ups. These reactions depend mainly on the people and the organizations involved. However, sometimes the participation of an experienced facilitator was shown to be very helpful. Project partners have found a number of different ways of trying to manage or overcome obstacles, asymmetries, sensitivities which have been discerned and that might lead to inequalities becoming evident as obstacles, to an imbalance, to tension and friction. A motto learned from all these is: Don’t burn your bridges after the first few frustrating experiences, but continue ! Israelis may feel that they want to help the Palestinians or other Arabs in the project, but wonder how this can be done without appearing to be patronizing. This is in itself evidence that these Israelis are conflicted about being patronizing. Both Israelis and Palestinians sometimes feel that their own academic level is higher than that of their partners; or that the administrative base on the other side is not solid enough ( the Israelis might think); while the Palestinians might think that the administrative basis of the Israelis is too organized, too pedantic at the expense of spontaneity and creativity. Ways of trying to overcome these difficulties are, among others, to invite an outsider to give a workshop to participants from both sides, especially at the beginning; or to make sure that all the work is divided equally and equitably between the partners. This aspect of concern about equality and symmetry - or their opposite - is also very noticeable in writing up projects, be it at the outset to obtain funding or to complete a report, interim or final; or for writing papers to be published. How to proceed ? Should each side write its part separately ? Or should they sit down together and jointly write a report or a paper. We all know well enough from our own experiences in joint projects among what appear to be more easy partners - in the sense that there are not so many tensions built into the relationship from the beginning: there too this particular area - writing joint reports or papers - is one where sensitivities, hurts and bad feelings crop up often and easily. And how much more so must we expect this to happen under the conditions where two opposite sides represent to each other - at least in some way - the enemy. Here, the personal becomes so easily camouflaged by the political. In fact, ways of writing reports by different teams are different. In addition the collaboration makes it at times more difficult to present the report on time. In such a situation, the question of blame may arise. On the other hand, once a joint report or paper has gone out in a way that both sides are satisfied with, that both feel equally represented - this then often serves as a major boost for the partnership. Another way of looking at this same situation is to say that there are suspicions on both sides, particularly initially: How will "they" treat me, relate to me ? Am I good enough, as good as they ? Or maybe better ? These, then, are competitive feelings, again closely interweaving with the political and cultural relationship between the two sides. Feelings of superiority or of feeling patronizing can take a variety of forms: They may be strictly professional - from each side. Or they may also involve political views: what have they done to us ? They are the occupiers. They strangle us economically. Their soldiers kill our people. Wherever we go, we are subjected to their scrutiny, their will, their arbitrariness. Or on the Israeli side: Why don’t they come out and say publicly that they disapprove of terrorist acts ? Why are there Israeli peace organizations (like Peace Now) that existed for many years. And only very recently did a Palestinian organization of this kind come into being and it is still very much in its infancy. The implied statement then often is: We (especially Israeli intellectuals) seem to want peace more than you (Palestinian intellectuals) do. Some Israelis feel that the Palestinians are not critical enough about their society, while they, the Israelis allow themselves to be quite critical. Other experiences, however, show that Palestinians can indeed be quite critical about their society, its democratic foundation and implementation, its human rights record. Palestinians also often feel that the Israelis do not speak out clearly enough against the continued occupation and the many wrongs it inflicts on the Palestinian situation or against the government that has brought the peace process to a standstill. They feel strongly about the basic asymmetry - and injustice - perpetuated by the political status quo. Often, a basic feeling lurking in the background is a comparison between the two peoples: Who has suffered more ? And is therefore more of a victim ? On the other hand, the question is raised of who is more to blame. These feelings often come out in different forms, when tensions between the two cooperating groups mount. Then feelings about the beginnings of the conflict will also come up. They may be more or less open or directly expressed. Israelis will remind themselves, or more rarely their partners, that since the times of the mandate, in the thirties and in the forties, Arab governments or representatives repeatedly turned down possible compromise solutions. And that after the partition resolution in the United Nations in 1947, they attacked the Israeli "Yishuv" with its armies. Palestinians have their versions of early events. They are convinced that the "Haganah", the forerunner of the Israeli army, wilfully and purposefully pushed Palestinian inhabitants out of the villages or cities they lived in to "free" these for Israelis and especially the immigrants to come. That in fact the Haganah wilfully scared Palestinians into fleeing and thus evacuating these areas. In this connection, the two most terrible massacres of Palestinians are always brought up: Deir Yassin where some 200 men, women and children were massacred in a village near Jerusalem in April of 1948. The other event occurred in the fall of 1956, at the time of the Suez Operation when border guards killed some 43 civilian men returning from their fields in the Arab village of Kafr Kassem - supposedly because they were out on the streets at a time of curfew. On the other side are the attacks at the entrance to the Judaean mountains of lorries bringing food and water to Jerusalem - the begining of the siege of Jerusalem. A week after Deir Yassin, a convoy of medical personnel going to the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem was ambushed killing the doctors and nurses in Sheikh Jerrakh on the way to Mount Scopus. The debate then focusses on: who started it ? We believe that here we can see both a political argument developing as to the justice or injustice of each side; but also a moral superiority relating to "look at the terrible wrongs you have committed" and "the blame that must be assigned to you for not allowing or facilitating a peaceful compromise to be accepted and implemented - but instead the reverse". This "moral superority" is to our mind parallel to the "professional" superiority lurking in the background of project partners’ minds. Sometimes what is felt to be needed is an "icebreaker" - by which is meant a special kind of intervention intended to overcome difficulties, initial or later, by, for example, an open discussion of some of the feelings or tensions involved. This is done mostly by a twosome of one member from each side; or by an outsider. At other times a brainstorming session - i.e. a more intellectual effort at discussing some of the stresses and strains in the cooperative project - called at a difficult moment has been felt to be helpful. In summing up, many project participants felt and feel that naturally, different teams work in different ways. But what is common to all is that this is a work situation that creates much tension and almost constantly demands a considerable amount of personal emotional investment and a developing of personal relationships. At the same time it is felt by many that participation in such projects also brings with it deep satisfaction.
There is a general feeling that these joint bi- tri- or multilateral projects are important by the mere fact that they exist. Yet not enough publications result from the projects. It is unclear to what extent this is a reluctance to finalize and publish or to what degree here, too, political overtones are involved. Difficulties arising from the personal relationship between the two participant groups While so far we have been listing difficulties that mainly arise out of the fact that each group represents its constituency, we must also be aware of the fact that difficulties or obstacles can and do arise from problems or conflicts between the individuals participating as people with personalities that may clash at times. These personal conflicts again easily lead into the political arena, which may take on a more dominant role, so that the interpersonal conflict seems to disappear from sight. This is a point well worth bearing in mind when one is collaborating on a project. To phrase it differently, the political conflict is always latently available and can easily be called upon with the - mostly unconscious - purpose of pushing the interpersonal conflict aside. We believe that the parallel phenomenon in a non-political collaboration would be to displace the personal conflict on a professional area. Psychodynamic understanding of the processes as they affect the indvidual and the group Some participants enter these projects with a great deal of enthusiasm while others go into them with much concern and anxiety. As in most other situations, the danger for the enthusiastic participants is considerably greater - that they will be quickly and painfully disilllusioned as they encounter difficulties and hurdles. The more cautious and concerned persons will often subsequently have an easier time, when they do overcome the hurdles which they feared. We know this phenomenon - of higher expectations leading to greater disillusionment - from other areas. .Obviously in this kind of meeting, there are innumerable events which arise because of 1) either intragroup processes in one group or 2) intergroup processes between the two or more groups. We will give some examples in an effort to show the multiplicity of such phenomena and their great variety. Among intragroup processes, we encountered some of the following: Some group members were noticeably silent. They could not be individually encouraged to talk. It was only when the group phenomenon - their carrying some resistance against the group process - was addressed, that this particular obstacle could be overcome. The phenomenon seen was that a number of group members began to be active, but seemed unable to continue their effort at leadership - either because of apparent hesitation in themselves, or through being "shot down" by another member of their group. his turned out to be related both to intense competitiveness for leadership of the group as well as a fear of attack if they indeed did assume potent leadership. A phenomenon frequently seen to be used by either a group or one or more individuals is the holding on to patterns of the past at the expense of addressing current reality issues. This may be both in terms of the group as such, the ‘side’, or it may be a more personal pattern which is then applied to the relations between the groups. The basic assumption of dependence could be observed frequently in the larger group consisting of the two sides. This took the form, as in other groups, mostly at the beginning, of asking for lectures, explanations, guidance or other forms of leadership by others which would leave them in the dependent role. An intergroup phenomenon of the basic assumption of fight would sometimes develop between the two ‘cooperating’ groups. It could be seen to be an attempt to defend against unconscious shame and guilt and as a way of shifting the blame to the other side. This is part of a phenomenon described as "deployment" by one of us (Moses-Hrushovski, 1994). Another form of "deployment" -when the individual ‘deploys’ his/her mental forces to defend or attack as a general deploys his armies - is seen in the strong withholding of empathy from the viewpoint, the sense of entitlement and the suffering of the other side - described remarkably clearly and convincingly by Grossman ( 1989). When ideology and intellectual approaches at the expense of ‘real’ emotional participation and openness to new ideas begin to dominate a discussion, we have found that this can be a result of unconscious hurts or insults, which are not easily identified and addressed. This can happen as a consequence of a perceived insult to one of the groups, but also to one or more of its members. Then, such hurts may be a repetition of quite personal events, which here, however, are covered over by feelings between the groups and/or by political ideology. A holding on to black-or-white extreme positions, of allowing only the extreme option and no alternative to it, is often based on a fear that to give up the extreme position is either a sign of weakness, or, even worse, is seen as a total renouncing of the needs of one’s side, thus leading to a catastrophe. "If I acknowledge your needs to some extent, I am thereby giving credence to your needs" (cf Moses 1991). It is the unconscious version of the "zero-sum" position. This again can be seen in individuals who strengthen each other amongst one’s group, and thus can easily become a group phenomenon. Unconscious as well as partly conscious envy can appear either as an intra-group or an inter-group phenomenon. Such envy may relate to economic or other inequalities between the groups. It can then lead to feelings of giving up, despair and impotence. These may at other times be defended against by aggression against the other side and a wish to destroy the other or the process as such. Envy within a group may, as in the example given above, lead to sabotage of the participation of one’s side, or of the process; or it may show itself in self-effacement, impotence and inferiority. Both envy and aggression may base themselves upon a sense of entitlement (Moses 1989, Moses & Moses-Hrushovski, 1990) and grievance (Moses-Hrushovski, 1996) Finally, we would like to end with a word about that all-important and perhaps somewhat neglected affect: hate. Hatred is not felt to be acceptable between persons who cooperate. Hate is considered legitimate against people whom one does not know, has not met, who are ‘faceless’. Hatred - often passed from one generation to the next (cf Volkan 1991) - at times serves to preserve the status quo. (Cf also Yanai 1997). Hatred is usually chronic and stable. It easily serves to distort the view of reality. Often it is connected with a wish for revenge or even annihilation (cf Kernberg 1993). Conscious as well as partially conscious hatred can easily lead to a stalemate in negotiations or relations between feuding groups. Therefore, consciously discarded hate - about which we do not know enough - must be sought out and understood by professionals like us, so we can learn more about its impact upon cooperative projects. References Grossman D., 1989. Don’t pity them too much, in: The Yellow Wind, Delta, New York Kernberg O., 1993, The Psychopathology of Hatred, pp 61-79, in: Rage, Power and Aggression, Eds. R.A. Glick & S.P. Roose, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn Moses R., 1982, The group self and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Review of Psychoanalysis 9: 55-65 Moses R., 1989, Shame and entitlement: their relation to political process, pp 483-498, in: The Psychoanalytic Core, Essays in honor of Leo Rangell, Eds. H. Blum, E. Weinshel & F.R. Rodman, International Universities Press, Madison, CT. Moses R., 1991, Preparing for the negotiating process: The psychological dimension, Jerusalem J International Relations, 13(1): 77-89. Moses R. & Moses-Hrushovski, R., 1889 Reflections on the sense of entitlement, Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 45: 483-498. Moses-Hrushovski R., 1994, Deployment: Hiding behind power struggles as a character defense, Jason Aronson, NorthVale, NJ Moses-Hrushovski R., 1996, Remaining in the bunker long after the war is over: deployment in the individual, the group and the nation, pp 165-188, in: Psychoanalysis at the political border, Essays in honor of Rafael Moses, Eds., L. Rangell & R. Moses-Hrushovski Volkan V.D., 1991, On Chosen Traumas, Mind and Human Interaction, 3(1): 13-14† Yanai N., 1997, Hatred
in the national context, (Hebrew) pp 83-100, in: Ben Zeev A., (Ed.,),
ski, Zmora-Bitan, Tel Aviv |
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